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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act,” and collectively,
“Securities Acts”) in response to the stock market crash of 1929, which
devastated financial markets and plunged the nation into the Great
Depression. 1 Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC” or
“Commission”) enforcement under these laws is generally concerned
with those who are “primarily liable:” a person or entity that violates a
specific provision of the securities laws.2 However, the SEC has also

1. Erin L. Massey, Control Person Liability Under Section 20(a): Striking A
Balance of Interests for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 109, 111–
12 (2005).
2. George E. Van Hoey, Liability for “Causing” Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws: Defining the SEC’s Next Counterattack in the Battle of Central Bank,
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 248, 254 (2003).
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taken action against those who are secondarily liable.3 That is, those
who were in a “control relationship” with the perpetrator, or they aided
and abetted the violations.4
The SEC has multiple rationales for pursuing secondary actors.
First, secondary actors often serve as “gate-keepers” (e.g., accountants,
lawyers, auditors, and others who can possibly detect and deter
fraudulent activity before it happens).5 Second, in cases of companies
such as Enron or WorldCom, the primary actor is bankrupt by the time
their wrongdoing is discovered, leaving defrauded investors with no way
to recoup their losses.6
Recognizing the need for increased liability for secondary actors
after the financial crisis of 2008, Congress included provisions in the
Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”), which made it easier for the SEC to
pursue both aiders and abettors and control persons. 7 The extent to
which these new powers will be used relies largely on how courts
interpret the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus Capital Group
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.8
Part I of this Note will explain the statutory authority the SEC uses
to pursue secondary actors before Dodd-Frank. Part II will examine the
degree to which administrative and federal courts have demanded the
SEC prove each element of liability. Part III will explain statutory
changes brought by Dodd-Frank. Finally, Part IV will explain the
implications of the Janus decision, and its impact on SEC enforcement
for secondary actors.
I. SECONDARY LIABILITY IN THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
This Part will lay out the legal remedies the SEC sought in pursuing
aiders, abettors, and control persons prior to the changes implemented in
Dodd-Frank, as well as the legislative history underlying the language of
the statutes.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id. at 265.
Shuenn (Patrick) Ho, A Missed Opportunity for “Wall Street Reform”:
Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud After the Dodd-Frank Act, 49 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 175, 183–84 (2012).
6. Id. at 185.
7. See infra Part III.
8. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
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A. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY IN THE SECURITIES ACTS
Initially, the SEC had very limited authority to bring aiding and
abetting actions. 9 The only provision under the Securities Acts that
imposed liability for aiding and abetting was section 15(b)(4) of the
1934 Act and pertained only to broker-dealers.10 The SEC still brought
aiding and abetting charges, however, by using formulations of tort law
and criminal law to justify its authority. 11 The actions generally
accompanied charges of Section 10(b), the SEC’s catchall provision on
fraud charges, and Rule 10b-5,12 the SEC rule promulgated pursuant to
Section 10(b).13
In the decades following the passage of the Securities Acts,
numerous attempts were made to amend them to explicitly prohibit
aiding and abetting. 14 However, the SEC did not officially gain
statutory authority to pursue aiders and abettors until 1995, when
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation and Reform Act
(“PSLRA”). 15 The PSLRA added Section 20(e), which, prior to the
changes implemented by Dodd-Frank, provided:

9. Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities
Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637, 639–41 (1988) [hereinafter
Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud].
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2012).
11. See, e.g., SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (allowing
aiding and abetting due to criminal law formulation of aiding and abetting theory).
12. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits the use “in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . [of] any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe.” Rule 10b–5 of the SEC,
promulgated under section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to “employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or to “engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 225–26 (1980).
13. Id.; see, e.g., Timetrust, 28 F. Supp. at 43 (allowing aiding and abetting due to
criminal law formulation of aiding and abetting theory).
14. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, supra note 9, at
641–42.
15. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.104–67, 109 Stat.
737 (1995) (“For purposes of any action brought by the Commission under paragraph
(1) or (3) of section 21(d), any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to
another person in violation of a provision of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued
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For purposes of any action brought by the Commission under
paragraph (1) or (3) of section 21(d), any person that knowingly or
recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation
of a provision of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this
title, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.16
As will be discussed later, the portion of the PSLRA granting the
SEC explicit authority to pursue aiders and abettors was in large part a
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank v. Denver,
which cast doubt on the ability of the SEC to pursue enforcement
actions against aiders and abettors.17
B. CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY IN THE SECURITIES ACTS
The Securities Acts each have specific provisions aimed at
imposing liability on those who were in a control relationship with those
who committed illegal acts. 18 The addition of provisions creating
liability for this behavior were a result of the general sentiment that
many of those who had contributed most to the crash were shielded from
liability because of the regulatory scheme at the time.19 Section 15 of
the 1933 Act provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or
understanding with one or more persons by or through stock
ownership, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections
[11 or 12] of this title shall be also liable jointly and severally with
and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person
had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the

under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent
as the person to whom such assistance is provided.”).
16. Id.
17. See infra Part II.
18. Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Controlling Person Liability Under
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities Act, 53
BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (1997) [hereinafter Bromberg & Lowenfels, Controlling Person
Liability].
19. See id.
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existence of the facts by reasons of which the liability of the
20
controlled person is alleged to exist.

Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act contains similar language, and it has
been recognized to have been modeled on the 1933 Act:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable (including to the Commission in any
action brought under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this
title), unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation
21
or cause of action.

The legislative history behind the 1934 Act makes it clear that the
purpose of these sections was to prevent those who were actually
ordering the illegal behavior from escaping liability.22 As Congressman
Lea explained on the House floor, the purpose of the provision was
“to catch the man who stands behind the scenes and controls the man
who is in a nominal position of authority.”23 In order to ensure that the
statute covered the myriad ways in which control could be asserted,
Congress intentionally omitted a definition of “control” from the
statutory language. 24 In response to criticism from the securities
industry that the definition of control person was too broad, Congress
added the “no knowledge” or “reasonable ground” defense to the 1933
Act, and the “good faith” defense to the 1934 Act.25 The part of the
provision explicitly granting power to the Commission was not in the

20. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C § 770(a)-(b) (2012) (“[A]ny person that
knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of
a provision of this subchapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under this subchapter,
shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to
whom such assistance is provided.”).
21. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
22. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Controlling Person Liability, supra note 18, at 3.
23. Id.
24. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 26 (1934) (“It would be difficult if not impossible to
enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exerted.”).
25. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Controlling Person Liability, supra note 18, at 3.
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original acts, leading to some dispute as to whether or not the
Commission was covered.26
II. SECONDARY LIABILITY ENFORCEMENT PRIOR TO DODD-FRANK
In order to understand the impact the changes to Dodd-Frank could
have on the SEC’s ability to bring enforcement actions against
secondary actors, a review of the level of scrutiny demanded by federal
courts and administrative law judges is necessary. This Part will discuss
the elements required to show aiding and abetting in both federal courts
and SEC administrative proceedings, 27 and discuss the impact of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver28 and the PSLRA on those elements. It will then discuss
the ambiguity as to the SEC’s ability to bring actions against control
persons prior to Dodd-Frank.
A. ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING IN FEDERAL COURTS PRIOR TO
DODD-FRANK
1. Aiding and Abetting Prior to Central Bank
The SEC first used its powers against an aider and abettor in 1939,
in SEC v. Timetrust.29 The case concerned fraudulent activity on the
part of Timetrust Corporation, but the aiding and abetting action was
against several individuals and Bank of America.30 The SEC cited no
provision to include the aiding and abetting defendants. Instead, it
relied on general principles of criminal law, arguing that in a criminal
proceeding, anyone who aided and abetted a crime could be charged as a
co-defendant.31 Therefore, it stood to reason the same rationale should

26.
27.

See infra Part III.
While the primary focus of this Note is enforcement actions in federal courts,
as Janus and Dodd-Frank will affect the SEC’s abilities to seek disciplinary action in
administrative proceedings, a brief discussion of the elements necessary to impose
liability in administrative proceedings is necessary.
28. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
29. SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
30. Id. at 36.
31. Id.
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apply in an administrative proceeding for a violation of the securities
laws.32 The court agreed with this argument.33
The next case crucial to the development of the formulation of
aiding and abetting liability in a federal case was actually a private
action case. In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life, the court found for
the plaintiff in an action against an issuer of securities who aided and
abetted a Section 10(b) violation. 34 The court rejected the defense’s
argument that the lack of explicit language pertaining to aiding and
abetting in the Securities Acts meant that there was no remedy for aiding
and abetting.35 The court indicated that the federal securities laws were
intended to be applied with “broad and remedial” purposes. 36 By
limiting their application too narrowly, courts would be unable to apply
them to the various new situations that could present themselves. 37
Therefore, the court found, courts should apply liability for aiding and
abetting pursuant to Rule 10b-5.38
The court also pointed out that the legislative history actually
indicated that the SEC should have power to pursue aiders and abettors:
If it was then generally understood that the SEC had injunctive
power against aiders and abettors under the 1934 Act, as the
legislative hearings on the proposed amendments indicate, the
defendant here cannot successfully contend that the failure to pass
the clarifying amendment shows a Congressional intent that the Act
39
has no applicability to aiders and abettors.

32.
33.
34.

Id. at 43.
Id.
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680–81 (N.D.
Ind. 1966).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (“[A] statue with a broad and remedial purpose such as the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 should not easily be rendered impotent to deal with new and
unique situations within the scope of the evils intended to be eliminated. In the absence
of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, the statute must be flexibly applied so
as to implement its policies and purposes. In this regard, it cannot be said that civil
liability for damages, so well established under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
may never under any circumstances be imposed upon persons who do no more than aid
and abet a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
39. Id. at 678.
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The court went on to find liability, citing the Third Restatement of
Torts’ language on liability for those acts that aid in the tortious conduct
of a third party.40
Courts continued to use the combination of tort law and criminal
law to find secondary actors liable for aiding and abetting violations of
the securities laws, and eventually, a three-part test was accepted by all
circuit courts with regards to the elements needed to prove aiding and
abetting liability.41 First set forth by the Sixth Circuit in SEC v. Coffey,
the test for establishing liability demanded (1) the existence of a
securities law violation by the primary party, (2) knowledge of the
violation by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the primary
violation, and (3) “substantial assistance” by the aider and abettor in the
achievement of the primary violation.42
2. Central Bank and Its Impact on Aiding and Abetting Liability
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of civil liability for
aiders and abettors in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A.43 A primary reason the Court granted certiorari
was to resolve the circuit split with respect to what level of scienter
satisfies the “knowledge of violation” prong. 44 The Court, however,
struck down the private right of action for aiding and abetting section
10(b) violations altogether.45

40. Id. (“For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
a person is liable if he ‘(b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
‘(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his
own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.”).
41. 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §
12.25 (2004).
42. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.3d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974).
43. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
44. SEC v. Peretz, 317 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D. Mass. 2004) (citing Dinsmore v.
Squadron, Ellenoff, Plelent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 125 F.3d 837, 844 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“[O]ne of the question on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Central Bank
was whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for aiding and abetting in
the absence of a duty to disclose or act.”)).
45. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 164.
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The case concerned an issuance of bonds by the Colorado SpringsStetson Hills Public Building Authority.46 These bonds were backed by
landowner liens, supposedly worth 160% of the bonds’ outstanding
principal and interest.47 Central Bank, which was serving as trustee for
the bond issue, received notice that the property values for the land
backing the bonds was dropping, but delayed making an independent
appraisal.48 Before they were able to do so, the Authority defaulted on
the bond. 49 Shareholders brought suit against, among others, Central
Bank, alleging it was secondarily liable under section 10(b) for its
conduct in aiding and abetting the fraud.50 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
ruled that the language of section 10(b) did not allow private litigants to
reach aiders and abettors in derivative actions.51
The Court’s holding was structured on a strict reading of the
language of the 1934 Act. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
indicated that Congress had the opportunity to include the language “aid
and abet” in the statutory language.52 Its decision not to do so, Justice
Kennedy concluded, implied that it did not intend aiding and abetting
violations to be covered. 53 Justice Kennedy also pointed out that
provisions in the 1934 Act included a separate section specifically
establishing liability for aiding and abetting for broker-dealers,
bolstering his argument that Congress did not implicitly intend for
aiding and abetting liability to attach to section 10(b). 54 Finally, the
Court acknowledged criminal law’s doctrine on aiders and abettors, but
rejected its application to section 10(b). 55 Warning of the potential
consequences of applying civil liability to a section 10(b) action, Justice
Kennedy argued that attaching civil liability to aiding and abetting
section 10(b) violations would imply that a civil cause of action could be

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 167.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 177 (“[I]f . . . Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability,
we presume it would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory test. But it
did not.”).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 183.
55. Id. at 190–191.
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attached to not only every provision of the Securities Acts, but to any
criminal statute.56
The majority opinion also stressed that this holding did not exempt
secondary actors from liability. 57 The simple solution to imposing
liability on secondary actors, the Court explained, was to charge them
with a primary violation.58 Any secondary actor, the Court pointed out,
who meaningfully participated in some sort of fraudulent scheme, could
potentially be charged under Section 10b-5 or another provision in the
Securities Acts.59
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, took issue with the
majority’s statement that the holding was limited to private rights of
action. 60 Justice Stevens warned that the majority’s interpretation of
section 10(b) would have far-reaching impact, arguing that the language
of the opinion could easily be interpreted to limit the SEC from pursuing
liability under section 10(b). 61 Justice Stevens also warned that the
language of the majority could be interpreted to extend beyond section
10(b) actions, arguing that the analysis posited by the majority could be
applied to any form of secondary liability not explicitly spelled out in
the Securities Acts’ statutes.62
Justice Stevens was correct to be wary of the decision’s impact on
SEC actions. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfolder,63 the Court held that in
order for a plaintiff to win damages in a section 10(b) action, he must

56. Id. (“[W]e would also have to hold that a civil aiding and abetting cause of
action is available for every provision of the Act. There would be no logical stopping
point to this line of reasoning: Every criminal statute passed for the benefit of some
particular class of persons would carry with it a concomitant civil damages cause of
action.”).
57. Id. at 191.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
61. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority leaves little doubt that the Exchange
Act does not even permit the SEC to pursue aiders and abettors in civil enforcement
actions under § 10(b). . . .”).
62. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, the majority’s approach to aiding and
abetting at the very least casts serious doubt, both for private and SEC actions,
on other forms of secondary liability that, like the aiding and abetting theory, have long
been recognized by the SEC and the courts but are not expressly spelled out in the
securities statutes.”).
63. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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prove that the violator had the requisite scienter.64 In a subsequent SEC
enforcement action, the Court applied the same burden to the SEC,
using the same rationale.65 The majority in Central Bank, like that in
Hochfelder, was using a strict statutory construction, which could easily
be interpreted by courts as being applied to the SEC.66 As it happened,
in the immediate aftermath of the Central Bank decision, the SEC
amended twenty-six aiding and abetting complaints.67
3. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
The impact of the decision in Central Bank, however, was not lost
in Congress. Almost immediately, it passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.68 Section 104 of the PSLRA amended
the 1934 Act to add section 20(e), which provided:
[F]or purposes of any act brought by the Commission . . . any person
that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in
violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation
issued under this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under
this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to
69
the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.

Despite the clear language of the statute, the SEC’s ability to bring
actions was nonetheless challenged almost immediately.
In SEC v. Fehn, the SEC brought charges against an attorney for
aiding and abetting numerous securities laws by filing Form 10-Q,

64.
65.
66.

Id. at 185–86.
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The principle
the Court espouses today—that liability may not be imposed on parties who are not
within the scope of § 10(b)’s plain language—is inconsistent with long-established SEC
and judicial precedent . . . . judicial restraint does not always favor the narrowest
possible interpretation of rights derived from federal statutes.”).
67. Scott M. Murray, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver:
The Supreme Court Chops a Bough from the Judicial Oak: There is No Implied Private
Remedy to Sue for Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 30
NEW ENG. L. REV. 475, 540 (1996).
68. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat
737 (1995).
69. SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 1996).
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which mischaracterized the role of the director.70 Fehn challenged the
SEC’s ability to bring the case, citing, as Justice Stevens warned, the
decision in Central Bank for the proposition that there was no liability
for aiding and abetting violations of the 1934 Act.71 The Ninth Circuit,
however, quoted the clear language of the statute, and numerous parts of
the legislative history, and held that the PSLRA had reversed the impact
of Central Bank on SEC enforcement actions.72 The court also rejected
Fehn’s argument that the statute did not apply to his action because it
was not passed until after the litigation proceeded.73 The court pointed
out that prior to Central Bank, which was not decided at the time of
Fehn’s actions, the SEC had authority to pursue aiding and abetting
violations. 74 Furthermore, the court found that the language of the
PSLRA with respect to aiding and abetting mirrored that of existing case
law, which indicated that it was the intent of Congress to keep in place
the definition of aiding and abetting that existed prior to Central Bank.75
4. Circuit Split on the Knowledge Requirement After PSLRA
As this section will explain, although the PSLRA established that
the SEC had the ability to bring aiding and abetting claims, it did not
resolve all ambiguities as to the standard necessary for bringing such
claims. Despite the fact that the statute provides that the level of
scienter necessary for knowledge of a primary violation is “knowingly,”
the circuits were split over whether this standard was limited to
situations where the defendants had actual knowledge of the primary
violation, or whether they should have known of the primary violation.
The court in Fehn, the first circuit court to discuss this matter, came
to the conclusion that “knowingly” did, in fact, refer to actual
knowledge.76 The Ninth Circuit based this decision, in part, on the fact

70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1282.
Id.
Id. at 1283 (“Legislative history confirms that Section 104 was intended to
override Central Bank ’s apparent elimination of the SEC’s power to enjoin the aiding
and abetting of securities law violations.”).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1284.
75. Id.
76. SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996).

652

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XIX

that the level of scienter needed for establishing liability for aiding and
abetting section 10(b) violations traditionally was “knowingly.”77
The Second Circuit also acknowledged that the SEC had authority
to assert aiding and abetting actions under section 10(b), but limited
liability to situations regarding actual knowledge.78 Although the Second
Circuit based its rationale on a simple textual reading of the statute,79 in
SEC v. KPMG, the Southern District of New York went further into
depth about the rationale for limiting liability to cases involving actual
knowledge.80 The case concerned an accounting fraud perpetrated by
the Xerox Corporation, in which Xerox misstated revenues by over $6
billion.81 The SEC filed an enforcement action against KPMG, Xerox’s
auditors, and four individuals who were KPMG partners at the time of
the audit. 82 Although the SEC settled its case against KPMG, it
continued its enforcement action against the individual partners for
aiding and abetting Xerox’s violations of the 1934 Act.83 In doing so,
the SEC argued that “recklessly” should be read into the PSLRA
provisions.84
In discussing the SEC’s claim against Thomas Yoho, a KPMG
partner, for aiding and abetting, the court stated that the new provision
provided for in the PSLRA should include cases where the person aiding
and abetting should have known the primary violation was taking
place.85 The court pointed out that “knowingly” had been defined as
actual knowledge in the other places in the PSLRA, leading to the
presumption that it should be applied in a similar way to the subsection
regarding SEC actions as well.86
The court also pointed to the PSLRA’s legislative history, which
indicated that the Senate actually rejected an amendment that would
77.
78.

Id.
See SEC v. United States Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1998)
(acknowledging that the SEC had the authority under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act to pursue aiders and abettors but choosing not to address the issue of
whether it address prior conduct because the SEC had not used argument in lower court
decision).
79. Id.
80. See SEC v. KPMG, LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
81. Id. at 353.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 382–83.
85. Id. at 383.
86. Id.
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have included a recklessness standard.87 In an attempt to expand the
SEC’s authority further, Senator Robert Bryan attempted to amend the
bill to explicitly add a recklessness standard.88 The Bryan Amendment
was ultimately voted down. 89 The court in KPMG interpreted the
rejection of the amendment to mean that Congress intended actual
knowledge to be necessary for an aiding and abetting action, and
therefore rejected the SEC’s argument. 90 Other courts employed a
similar rationale to conclude that the standard was “knowingly.”91
Despite the reasoning of the KPMG and Fehn courts, other circuits
came to the conclusion that the language in the PSLRA did include a
recklessness standard.92 In SEC v. Tambone, the First Circuit found that
recklessness was indeed covered.93 In Tambone, the SEC alleged that
executives of a mutual fund, Columbia Funds Distributor, aided and
abetted in misrepresentations made in fund prospectuses.94 The court
found that because the defendants had a duty to disclose the violations,
recklessness was indeed sufficient to meet the “knowingly” prong of the
PSLRA.95 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the First Circuit in Graham v.
SEC, finding that recklessness was sufficient to meet the scienter
requirement.96
5. “Substantial Assistance” Element in Federal Courts
Prior to 2012, the element of substantial assistance hinged on
proximate cause.97 This was illustrated best in a Second Circuit case
concerning a former Connecticut State Senator, Joe DiBella.98 DiBella
had served on the Investment Advisor Council, which oversaw decisions
made by the Connecticut State Treasurer.99 The SEC alleged that the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
99.

Id. at 357.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 383.
Bromberg & Lowenfels, Controlling Person Liability, supra note 18, at 10.
See, e.g., SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2008).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 144.
Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
See infra Part IV.
See SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 566 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 558.
Id.
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State Treasurer, Paul Silvester, had made an agreement to invest $75
million of Connecticut’s pension fund with an asset management firm in
exchange for fees for himself and DiBella.100 Silvester eventually pled
guilty to Federal Racketeering charges; and DiBella was charged,
among other things, with aiding and abetting Silvester in engaging in a
fraudulent scheme contrary to Rule 10b-5 for his part in the fraud.101
In evaluating DiBella’s actions, the court explained in order to
satisfy the substantial assistance prong to show aiding and abetting
liability, the SEC had to show that the aider and abettor proximately
caused the violation.102 It was clear to the court that DiBella fit this
role.103 DiBella had arranged the meeting, knew that the Silvester was
required to present all investment opportunities to the Investment
Advisor Council, and knew that he had in fact not done so.104 Moreover,
when prodded by the asset management firm, Dibella convinced
Silvester to raise Connecticut’s stake in the firm by $25 million. 105
Thus, the court held, there was substantial evidence that DiBella
knowingly aided and abetted Silvestre in violating Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 106 This analysis represented the typical analysis of the
substantial assistance prong prior to 2012.107
6. Elements of Aiding and Abetting in Administrative Proceedings
The primary difference between SEC administrative proceedings
and enforcement actions is that the former are adjudicated by
administrative law judges rather than federal district court judges. 108
Under this arrangement, either the defendant or the agency can appeal

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 559–60.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 566–67.
Id. at 567.
See also SEC v. Benger, 697 F.Supp.2d 932, 942–43 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
SEC administrative proceedings differ from enforcement actions in that they
are heard initially by an administrative law judge rather than a federal district court
judge. For a brief discussion of the differences between two, see How Investigations
Work, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/
1356125787012#.Us3kOJETFuY (last visited July 15, 2013).
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the initial decision to the Commission itself.109 Depending on what end
it seeks to achieve, the SEC can bring both enforcement and
administrative actions.110 Historically, the SEC has taken a more lenient
view as to the elements required to find liability for aiding and abetting
in administrative proceedings.111
Initially, the theory of liability argued by the SEC for aiders and
abettors was as undefined as those in federal courts.112 In one of the
earliest cases, the SEC found that a broker-dealer knowingly aidedabetted his partner’s fraud on his investors.113 In finding liability, the
administrative law judge determined that the defendant had reason to
know that the actions he took would allow his co-defendant to effect
fraud. 114 Therefore, it is apparent that in early cases the knowledge
requirement for aiding and abetting liability was merely constructive
knowledge that some sort of impropriety was taking place.115
In Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, however, the D.C. Circuit
rejected the SEC’s imposing this lower threshold for knowledge.116 The
SEC had sought disciplinary actions against brokers for aiding and
abetting a violation of section 17(e)(1).117 After the defendant appealed
the decision from the administrative law judge, the Commission tried to
impose a mere negligence requirement.118 The D.C. Circuit rejected this
formulation, finding that a mere negligence standard could impose
liability on those who were innocently part of a fraudulent scheme.119
The court then established a similar standard as that in Coffey, finding

109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, supra note 9, at

752–53.
112. Id at 753.
113. In re Burley & Co., Release No. 34-3838, 23 SEC 461 (Aug. 5, 1946),
available at 1946 WL 24142.
114. Id. at *2.
115. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, supra note 9, at
753.
116. Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d, 168, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
117. Id. at 170.
118. Id. at 177–78. (The SEC argued that that aiders and abettors should be held
liable “whenever [they] should have been able to conclude that [their] act was likely to
be used in furtherance of illegal conduct”).
119. Id.
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that this test balanced the need to protect the public interest of avoiding
fraud, without overburdening the securities industry with regulation.120
Not long after the decision in Investors Research, the Commission
used this formulation in the course of an administrative proceeding. In
re William R. Carter concerned two lawyers who allegedly abetted the
securities violations of a telephone equipment rental company.121 The
SEC brought an administrative proceeding alleging that the defendants
misrepresented the financial condition of the company to both the SEC
and stockholders under the SEC’s Rule (2)(e); had they been found
guilty, they would be barred from appearing before the Commission.122
The Commission, following the decision in Investors Research, found
that while actual knowledge was too high a standard, negligence would
be too harsh and would actually impose liability on those who were
innocently a party to fraudulent schemes.123 Thus, while the standard in
administrative proceedings did not rise to the level of actual knowledge
as in some circuits, recklessness was still required.
7. Substantial Assistance in Administrative Proceedings
SEC administrative proceedings require a lower standard for
liability than federal courts.124 In an early case, In re Richard Bruce &
Company, the SEC sought aiding and abetting liability against the vicepresident of Transition Systems, Stanley Gross.125 Transition Systems
had sold thousands of shares on reports that it had a “correlator” ready
for market. 126 The correlator allegedly could monitor the body
conditions of astronauts while in orbit, and the American Medical
Association was interested in it for its ability to detect cancer.127 While
Gross had nothing to do with the representations, the tribunal barred him
from association with broker-dealers anyway, finding that through his
120.
121.

Id. at 178.
In re William R. Carter, Release No. 34-17597, 22 SEC 292 (Feb. 28, 1981),
available at 1981 WL 384414.
122. Id. at *4.
123. Id. at *24–25.
124. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, supra note 9, at
753.
125. In re Richard Bruce & Co., Release No. 34-8303, 43 SEC 777, *3 (1968),
available at 1968 WL 86058.
126. Id. at *1.
127. Id.
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attendance at sales meeting, share of the profits, and general
participation in the company’s operations, Gross knew, or at least should
have known, of the illicit activities taking place.128 Thus, the SEC was
applying a reckless standard of knowledge, and limited action in
furtherance of the illegal activity.129
The case In re Glen Copeland also demonstrates the lower
standard necessary in administrative proceedings. In that case, the
company defrauded its customers by misrepresenting its profits. 130
Copeland had operated the company’s computer program.131 Each day,
the company’s senior vice-president, Dennis Greenman, asked Copeland
to multiply all account balances by an arbitrary number, in order to
conceal the fact that all of the accounts were actually losing money.132
Although Copeland argued he had no idea that Greenman was telling
him to do this to conceal losses, the SEC found liability for aiding and
abetting, stating that while he may not have been intimately involved in
the planning of the scheme, sufficient red flags were present to alert
Copeland that he was involved in illegal conduct.133 This standard is
indicative of the one taken in administrative proceedings. The court
simply required significant involvement, not proximate cause.134
B. ELEMENTS OF CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY PRIOR TO DODD-FRANK
Congress intentionally left control undefined because it can take so
many forms. 135 Given the lack of clear language or congressional
directive, the SEC attempted to add clarity for the purposes of
administrative proceedings by defining control explicitly as “the
possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through

128.
129.
130.

Id. at *3.
Id.
In re Glen Copeland, Release No. 34-22213, 48 SEC 193, 197–98 (1985),
available at 1983 WL 108674.
131. Id. at 196.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 196–97.
134. See also In re Del Mar Fin. Servs., Release No. 188, 75 SEC 1473 (2001),
available at 2001 WL 919968.
135. William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities LawsAiding and Abetting Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law
Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 356 (1989).
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the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”136 The
SEC’s definition has been accepted by several courts.137 As this section
will discuss, there is still substantial disagreement, however, over when
control person liability is supposed to attach,138 and whether the SEC
even has the authority to bring actions.139 The D.C. Circuit has made
note of the fact that courts’ interpretation of section 20 has been
inconsistent, particularly in the context of SEC enforcement actions.140
1. SEC’s Ability to Bring an Action
As this section will demonstrate, ambiguity under section 20(a) was
not limited to the definition of control or when a control person was
liable. In SEC v. Coffey, the Sixth Circuit denied the SEC the right to
bring enforcement actions under section 20(a). 141 It reasoned that
because section 20(b) “set forth the standard of lawfulness to which a
controlling person may conform, on penalty of liability in injunction to
the SEC or criminal prosecution . . . . [§ 20(a)] was meant only to
specify the liability of controlling persons to private persons suing to
vindicate their interest.”142 Furthermore, the SEC was not a person as
required by Section 20(a).143 Therefore, the SEC’s ability to bring an
action was limited to Section 20(b) violations.144
Most circuits, however, did not follow the decision in Coffey,
particularly after the Securities Act of 1975, which amended the
definition of person under the Exchange Act to include “a natural
person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of a government.”145
In SEC v. First Jersey, the SEC initiated an enforcement action
against both a broker-dealer and its principal.146 First Jersey convinced

136.
137.

17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2014).
See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc, 101 F.3d 1450, 1472–73 (2d Cir. 1996);
Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1998).
138. See infra Part II.B.b.
139. See id.
140. SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
141. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012).
146. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc. 101 F.3d 1450, 1456 (2d Cir. 1996).
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customers to buy securities at excessively high prices, making more than
$27 million in illegal profits.147 The action was against both First Jersey
and Robert Brennan, the director and 100% owner. 148 The Second
Circuit found that even if Brennan wasn’t found primarily liable for the
fraudulent actions, the SEC could still prosecute him under § 20(a).149
The court held that section 20(a) was available as an enforcement
mechanism to “any person to whom such controlled person is liable”
and stated that the new language in the 1934 Act could be interpreted to
find that the SEC was included in the definition of person.150
The Third Circuit agreed with this decision. 151 While it did not
disagree with the reasoning of Coffey at the time it was decided, the
court pointed out that the Coffey decision was undermined by the 1975
amendments to the Exchange Act, which modified the definition of
person from “an individual, corporation, partnership, association, joint
stock company, business trust, or unincorporated organization” to a
“natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency
or instrumentality of a government.”152 Therefore, the court found that
section 20(a) explicitly applied to the SEC.153
Prior to Dodd-Frank, however, not all courts followed the
reasoning that the SEC had the ability to bring an action under section
20(a).154 In SEC v. Stringer, an Oregon district court rejected the SEC’s
argument that the agency had authority to pursue an enforcement action
under section 20(a), choosing instead to follow the reasoning in
Coffey.155 Unlike Coffey, however, Stringer took into account the 1975
amendments, but chose to ignore them. 156 In response to the SEC’s
citation to the amendments to prove they were indeed a person who
could bring an action, the court responded that even with the new
language of the amendments, there still existed an “escape clause”
allowing courts to ignore the definitions when context suggested
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at 1458.
Id. at 1472.
Id.
SEC v. J.W. Barclay & Co., 442 F.3d 834, 842–43 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 842.
Id.
See, e.g., SEC v. Stringer, CIV. 02-1341-ST, 2003 WL 23538011, *4 (D. Ore.
Sept. 3, 2003).
155. Id. at *4.
156. Id. at *5–6.
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otherwise.157 The court went on to explain how the SEC should not be
defined as a person in this context, pointing out that for a party to be a
person under the statutory definition, secondary actors had to be jointly
and severally liable to the party.158 In other words, the person needed to
be an injured party.159 Since the SEC is a government agency rather
than a party that can be injured by a secondary actor, the court found it
would be stretching the statutory language too far to consider the SEC a
person. 160 The court then pointed out that there was little in the
legislative history of the 1975 amendments indicating any desire by
Congress to allow the SEC to pursue enforcement actions under section
20(a).161 The court concluded that although securities laws were meant
to be interpreted in accordance with their broad remedial purposes, the
text and legislative history simply did not indicate any authority for the
SEC to pursue section 20(a) violations.162
2. Elements Necessary to Prove Control Person Liability
In addition to the authority granted to the SEC to bring an action
under section 20(a), there is a split among the circuits over what would
constitute liability. 163 The SEC has codified an official definition in
order to establish a uniform standard.164 The definition provides that
control is “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership or voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”165
Even circuits that have adopted the SEC’s definition have not done so
word for word, and some have rejected it altogether. The two primary
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“The issue is not simply whether the SEC falls within the statutory
definition of the word ‘person.’ Instead, the issue is whether the SEC constitutes a
“person to whom such controlled person is liable,” not only generally but ‘jointly and
severally.’ It strains the statute to characterize a secondary actor as ‘liable to’ the SEC.
The SEC is the government agency tasked with enforcing the federal securities laws. It
is not an injured party.”).
161. Id.
162. Id. at *13.
163. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 414 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (explaining ambiguous state of law as to control person liability under § 20(a)).
164. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405 (2014).
165. Id.

2014]

DODD-FRANK'S IMPACT ON
SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

661

methods by which control is defined are the “potential control” test, and
the “culpable participation test”.
a. Culpable Participation Test
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits apply the “culpable
participation” test. 166 The Second Circuit applied this test in First
Jersey, explaining that “a plaintiff must show a primary violation by the
controlled person and control of the primary violator by the targeted
defendant, and show that the controlling person was in some meaningful
sense a culpable participant in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled
person.”167 The court also proffered a defense that could be made to a
section 20(a) charge, explaining that a control person could show good
faith by proving he put in place and enforced a “reasonable, proper
system of supervision and internal controls.”168 Thus, in order to escape
liability for First Jersey’s fraudulent activity, Robert Brennan would
have had to show that he had a system in place to detect and prevent the
conduct that was committed and personnel had just evaded the system.
In the matter at hand, the court found that First Jersey’s methods were
not genuinely designed to prevent fraud.169
b. Potential Control Test
The majority standard for control person liability is the “potential
control” test. 170 Although it exists in different iterations across the
circuits, the most common standard is the one articulated by the Eighth
Circuit.171 In order to show potential control, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant participated in the operations of the corporation in
question.172 The plaintiff then must prove “that the defendant possessed

166.
167.
168.
169.

Massey, supra note 1, at 114–15.
SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 1461 (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1185, 1202
(S.D.N.Y 1995)).
170. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Controlling Person Liability, supra note 18, at 10.
171. Id. at 14.
172. Id. at 14–15.
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the power to control the specific transaction upon which the primary
violation is predicated.”173
C. JANUS CAPITAL GROUP V. FIRST DERIVATIVE TRADERS AND ITS
APPLICATION TO SEC ENFORCEMENT FOR SECONDARY LIABILITY
This section will discuss the impact of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Janus Capital Group. v. First Derivative Traders and its
impact on the SEC’s strategy for bringing enforcement actions. First,
this section will explain the background of the case and the language of
the majority decision as well as that of the Justice Breyer’s dissent. It
will then explain how the Janus decision has been interpreted by courts
thus far. Finally, it will discuss how the decision will affect the SEC’s
enforcement strategy given the new remedies afforded them by DoddFrank.
1. Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders
Like Central Bank, the most recent Supreme Court case to have
possible implications on SEC enforcement actually concerned a private
right of action. In Janus Capital Group. v. First Derivative Traders, a
class of stockholders filed suit under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.174
The suit alleged that Janus Capital Management (“JCG”) and its wholly
owned subsidiary, Janus Capital Management (“JCM”), made false
statements in mutual fund prospectuses filed by Janus Investment Funds
(a separate legal entity owned entirely by its investors, for which Janus
Capital Management was the investment adviser and administrator).175
Specifically, the investors argued that prospectuses issued by Janus
Investment Fund stated that JCM would implement policies to curb
market timing, while in fact they entered into agreements encouraging
it.176 When a New York Attorney General’s investigation revealed the
secret agreements, investors withdrew significant amounts of money
from Janus Investment Fund mutual funds, which in turn caused JCG’s
173. Id. at 10 (quoting Brown v. Enstar Grp., Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 (11th Cir.
1996)).
174. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2300
(2011).
175. Id. at 2299.
176. Market timing is a trading strategy that exploits time delay in mutual funds’
daily valuation system. See id. at 2296 n.1.
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stock price to drop nearly 25%. 177 The plaintiffs in this action
previously owned JCG stock and argued that by claiming they would
take measures to curb market timing, JCG and JCM “materially misled”
the public.178 The plaintiffs also alleged that JCG should be held liable
as the control person for Janus Investment Funds. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari as to whether JCM made the material misstatements in
the prospectuses.179
The majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, found that JCM
did not make the misstatement. 180 Justice Thomas cited the Oxford
English Dictionary in explaining that to “make a statement” one must
have “ultimate authority over the statement,”181 and compared the role of
JCG to that of a speechwriter. 182 Justice Thomas also stated that a
broader reading of make would undermine Central Bank’s holding that
there is no private right of action against aiders and abettors, while
acknowledging that those actions could still be brought by the SEC.183
The majority also denied First Derivative’s argument that the
significant influence JCM wielded over Janus Investment Funds made it
liable.184 The Court declined to extend liability in this way, explaining
that it was “undisputed” that JCM and Janus investment fund were
legally separate entities.185
2. Justice Breyer’s Dissent and Warning About Implications
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, took issue with the
majority’s definition of “make,” pointing out that “every day, hosts of
corporate officials make statements with content that more senior
officials or the board of directors have ‘authority to control.’”186 Justice

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 2300.
Id.
Id at 2301.
Id.
Id at 2302.
Id. (“Even when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within
the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes credit-or
blame-for what is ultimately said.”).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2304. (“First Derivative’s theory of liability based on a relationship of
influence resembles the liability imposed by Congress for control.”).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Breyer argued that a contextual, case-by-case determination, was a
better test for whether someone “made” a statement.187
Justice Breyer also pointed out that Central Bank was
distinguishable because it dealt with issues of secondary liability,
whereas the case before the court concerned primary liability.188 Breyer
cited portions of Central Bank that discussed how secondary actors may
be liable, and pointed out that by ruling in favor of JCM, the majority’s
decision essentially extends Central Bank’s holding to those who are not
liable, given that Janus Management easily fell into the category of
those who were meant to be held liable.189
Much like the dissent in Central Bank, the dissent in Janus shows
concern that the majority opinion might reach further than the private
rights of action to which the opinion is ostensibly limited. As Justice
Breyer points out, given the majority’s holding made it exceedingly
difficult to find a single party who “made” a statement in cases similar
to Janus.”190 The SEC’s ability to pursue actions for aiding and abetting
would thereby be reduced as well, given need for a primary violation
when bringing an aiding and abetting charge. 191 Justice Breyer also
argued that while the majority’s decision was based on their professed
desire to avoid undermining Central Bank,192 by removing liability from
entities such as JCM, the majority was doing just that—it ignored
explicit restrictions the Central Bank decision gave on the interpretation
of its holding.193
3. Post-Janus Jurisprudence
At first glance, it is difficult to tell the impact of Janus. While
there is no doubt the decision limits the ability of private entities to seek

187.
188.

Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas responded to this argument
in a footnote to the majority opinion, acknowledging that Central Bank was indeed
about secondary liability. Justice Thomas explains that “[f]or Central Bank to have any
meaning, there must be some distinction between those who are primarily liable (and
thus may be pursued in private suits) and those who are secondarily liable (and thus
may not be pursued in private suits).” Id. at 2302 n.6.
189. Id. at 2307–08. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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damages under Section 10b-5, as this section will discuss, there is also
some indication that it will have an impact on SEC enforcement cases,
particularly in their pursuit of liability against secondary actors.
Therefore, the SEC’s strategy in pursing secondary actors to a large
degree depends on how expansively courts view the Janus holding.
While there have been few post-Janus cases, the ones that have been
decided indicate the diverging views that courts are taking towards the
holding. 194
a. Broad Interpretation of Janus
The Southern District of New York was the first court to analyze
the Janus decision in the context of an SEC enforcement action.195 SEC
v. Kelly concerned an enforcement action against former senior
executives at AOL Time Warner.196 The SEC charged that AOL had
paid inflated prices for goods and services, which were offset by large
“purchases” of online advertising, thereby artificially inflating AOL
Time Warner’s bottom line.197 The Commission asserted that each of
the defendants were aware of, and in some way contributed to, the
fraudulent activity, and brought charges under section 10(b), Rule 10b5, section 17(a)(1), 198 as well as for aiding and abetting those
violations.199
After Janus was decided, however, defendants Wovsaniker and
Rinder moved for judgment on the pleadings given that the new
194. See, e.g. SEC v. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 201); SEC v. Daifotis
874 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Cal. 2012); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt., PLC, 844 F.
Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
195. SEC v. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 307.
198. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful in the offer or sale of any
security, using the mails or an instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or
indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (2012).
199. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 321–22.
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standard for make foreclosed the SEC’s claims against them with
regards to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations.200 In an indication of
the impact of Janus on enforcement actions, the SEC acknowledged that
it could not proceed under Rule 10 b-5(b).201 However, the SEC argued
that it could still proceed under “scheme liability” under subsections
10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c).202
The court rejected this argument.203 While it acknowledged that the
Janus decision did not discuss scheme liability, it found that recasting
Rule 10b-5(b) claims as Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) claims was simply a
“back door into liability” meant to avoid limitations on Rule 10b-5(b)
actions. 204 The court relied heavily on Justice Thomas’s footnote in
response to Justice Breyer 205 to argue that the decision in Janus was
made in order to preserve the distinction between primary liability and
secondary liability.206 While the SEC had offered a mechanism to assert
its claim, the fact remained that none of the defendants had made a
misstatement as required by Janus, and therefore, the court argued, they
should not be held liable.207 The SEC’s approach would allow plaintiffs
to bring actions based on conduct the Janus court had found as
insufficient to establish primary liability.208
The court in Kelly also found that the Janus analysis was not
restricted to actions taken under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.209 The
200.
201.
202.

Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
Id.
Id. Whereas Rule 10b-5(b), which was the provision of Rule 10b-5 discussed
in the Janus decision, makes it illegal to “make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, Rule 10b-5(a)
bars the use of “any device, scheme or artifice to defraud” while Rule10b-5(c) prohibits
engaging in “any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014).
203. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
204. Id.
205. See supra note 188.
206. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
207. “The court explained that the alleged round trip transactions by AOL between
2000 and 2003 are deceptive only because of AOL’s subsequent public
misrepresentations. . . . It is the manner in which those transactions were accounted for
by AOL and reported to the public- AOL’s alleged improper recognition of advertising
revenue from such transactions - that is deceptive, and not the act of engaging in such
transactions itself.” Id. at 344.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 345.
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court rejected the SEC’s argument that actions were restricted to those
claims, finding that given the similar purposes with regards to primary
liability, application of Janus as to section 17(a) should be consistent
with application to Rule 10b-5(b).210 Thus, the SEC was still required to
show that the defendants “made” the misleading statements.211 Since the
SEC did not plead as such, the court found it could not impose liability
and dismissed all claims.212
This decision was likely troubling to the SEC and to those who
feared that Janus could be interpreted too broadly. By extending its
application to both scheme liability and section 17(a), the decision in
Kelly indicated that the window through which not only private parties,
but also the SEC could bring charges against secondary actors, was far
narrower than it had been before. The Central District of California has
followed this reasoning to extend Janus beyond Rule 10b-5(b) as
well.213
b. Broad Interpretation of Janus in Administrative Proceedings
In another troubling sign, in one of the few administrative
proceedings to consider the impact that Janus had on SEC enforcement
actions, an administrative law judge chose to apply the Janus standard to
scheme liability and section 17(a) charges.214 The SEC had brought an
administrative proceeding accusing the defendants, executives at State
Street, of misleading or making insufficient disclosures to investors as to
the extent of mortgage back securities held in their accounts.215 The
administrative law judge cited the decision in Kelly to find that Janus
did in fact apply, meaning that the SEC had to show that the defendants
had ultimate authority over the fraudulent statements. 216 Thus, the

210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 346.
SEC v. Perry, CV-11-1309 R, 2012 WL 1959566 1, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 31,
2012) (applying Janus to section 17(a) actions).
214. In re Flannery, Release No. 677, 101 SEC 1973 (Oct. 28, 2011), available at
2011 WL 10564337 (holding that under the Janus standard, defendants did not meet the
test of “ultimate authority or responsibility” for documents in which misstatements
were made).
215. Perry, 2012 WL 1959566, at *2.
216. Id.
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SEC’s ability to bring action was not simply limited to enforcement
actions in federal courts.
c. Narrow Interpretation of Janus
However, just months after the decision in SEC v. Kelly, a district
court in the Northern District of California interpreted Janus
differently. 217 In SEC v. Daifotis, the SEC brought an enforcement
action against two former Schwab YieldPlus Fund (a subsidiary of
Charles Schwab) executive officers, Randall Merk and Kimon P.
Daifotis.218 Daifotis was the lead portfolio manager of the YieldPlus
Fund, and he reported to Charles Schwab Investment Management,
where Merk was President.219 The SEC alleged that Daifotis and Merk
each made misleading statements about the safety of YieldPlus as an
investment vehicle, and made misleading statements to investors to
dissuade them from redeeming their investment when the Fund began to
decline in value.220
While the case was pending, Janus was decided. The defendants
therefore moved for reconsideration, hoping to have certain alleged
misstatements dismissed. 221 While the SEC maintained that the
defendants were still liable for the misstatements defendants sought to
dismiss, it did not contest the dismissal of the bulk of the allegations.222
Thus, as in SEC v. Kelly, the Commission essentially conceded its
reduced ability to pursue actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
after Janus.223
The court, however, rejected Daifotis’s argument that Janus applied
to section 17(a).224 In doing so, the court pointed out how precisely the
217.
218.
219.

SEC v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
Id. at 873–74.
SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 4714250, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 7, 2011).
220. Id.
221. Id. The defendants conceded that under Janus, they had “made” certain
statements, such as a set of questions and answers listing Merk as the author on
Schwab’s website, or statements made by Daifotis in a series of conference calls. Id. at
*2–3.
222. Id. at *4 (“[T]he Commission does not oppose that Janus renders all other
alleged misstatements in the complaint ineligible to serve as a base for claim one
liability against either defendant.”).
223. Id.
224. Id. at *5.
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Janus majority parsed the language of § 10(b) and distinguished it from
section 17(a), pointing out that the word “make,” which was the primary
statutory language discussed in Janus, did not exist in the language of
section 17(a).225
The court also rejected Daifotis’s defense that Janus should apply
to section 34(b) of the Investment Companies Act, 226 despite the fact
that that provision actually includes the word “make.” 227 The court
points out that Janus was limited to consideration of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.228 It held that applying Janus to all statutes would, in effect,
give the decision far too much weight and ignore the purpose of the
decision.229 Thus, the court did not extend Janus’s holding beyond Rule
10b-5.230
Cases after Daifotis and Kelly have shown a trend towards adopting
the rationale of the former. For example, in the Southern District of
New York, in SEC v. Pentagon Capital Management PLC,231 the court
did not even acknowledge Kelly, and instead relied on Daifotis to find
the lack of the word “make” in section 17(a) to mean that Janus should
not apply to enforcement actions under section 17(a), or scheme liability
pursuant to Rule 10b-5(a) or (c). 232 In doing so, the court also
emphasized the fact that Janus was a private suit as opposed to an
enforcement action, stating that it saw no indication from the Supreme
Court, or from Congress, that the Janus decision should extend beyond
Rule 10b-5. 233 Moreover, the Second Circuit on appeal declined to
conclusively discuss the extent to which Janus should apply, although it
acknowledged that Rule 10b-5(b) was the sole provision the Supreme
Court gave guidance on. 234 Other cases have followed the same

225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-33 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to make any
untrue statement of a material fact in any registration statement, application, report,
account, record, or other document filed or transmitted pursuant to this subchapter or
the keeping of which is required pursuant to section 80a-30(a) . . . .”).
228. Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6.
229. Id. (“Janus was not a touch stone to change myriad laws that happen to use the
word ‘make’; it was decision interpreting primary liability under Rule 10b-5.”).
230. Id.
231. SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt., PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
232. Id. at 422.
233. Id.
234. SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt., PLC, 725 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2013).
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rationale to find that Janus does not extend to other provisions of the
Securities Acts.235
The Southern District of New York has also explicitly rejected the
idea posited in Kelly that asserting scheme liability is simply a “backdoor” method of evading the Janus holding.236 In SEC v. Landberg, the
court considered an enforcement action against the management of an
unregistered investment advisory for misleading investors as to the
security of their funds.237 The court rejected the defendant’s argument
that Janus prohibited the SEC from bringing a Rule 10b-5 action,
pointing out that subsection (b) was not the only provision of section
10(b).238 Thus, given the decisions in Kelly, Landberg, and Pentagon
Capital Management, there is a split in the Second Circuit as to whether
Janus applies to SEC enforcement actions pursuant to Rule 10b-5(a) and
(c), and whether it applies beyond Rule 10b-5.
Some courts have questioned whether Janus should apply to SEC
enforcement actions at all.239 In SEC v. Brown, the Commission brought
an enforcement action against two former employees of Integral, a
publicly traded company that manufactures satellite systems and
software.240 It alleged that defendant Elaine Brown, in her capacity as
Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer, had violated
section 13(a) of the 1934 Act241 by failing to state in documents with the
SEC that Integral had re-hired a former executive who had been found
guilty of earlier securities violations.242 Brown argued that by narrowing
the private right of action under Rule 10b-5, the court in Janus was
implicitly suggesting that courts should not go beyond the plain
language of a statute to create individual liability where it does not
235. See, e.g., SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Janus
implicitly suggests that Section 17(a)(2) should be read differently from, and more
broadly than, Section 10(b).”); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“The operative language of
§§ 14(a) and 17(a) does not require that the defendant “make” a statement in order to be
liable.”).
236. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
237. SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
238. Id. at 154.
239. See, e.g., SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2012); SEC v.
Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at *14–15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30,
2012).
240. Id. at 112.
241. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2012).
242. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 112–13.
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exist.243 The court in Brown outright rejected this argument, and pointed
out that pursuant to section 21(d)(1) of the 1934 Act the SEC was
authorized to bring actions in district courts to enjoin violations of any
provision of its title.244 Thus, the court considered whether the SEC’s
ability to bring enforcement actions should be affected by Janus at all.245
The Northern District of Illinois expanded on this concept in SEC v.
Sentinel Management Group. 246 In discussing whether Janus should
apply to actions taken pursuant to section 17(a), the court noted that the
rationale behind the Court’s decision in Janus was a concern that an
overly expansive definition of “make” would expand the scope of
private suits.247 However, because section 17(a) did not create a private
right of action, the Supreme Court’s concerns were not implicated.248
Therefore, the court found Janus did not apply to section 17(a) actions,
while also strengthening the case for why it should not apply to SEC
enforcement actions at all.249
Thus, the state of law as to whether Janus applies beyond a Rule
10b-5 action is unclear. Even within the Second Circuit, there is a split
as to the extent in which it should apply. 250 Furthermore, there is a
strong case to be made that the decision should never apply to SEC
enforcement actions. 251
III. IMPACT OF DODD-FRANK ON STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR SEC TO
BRING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Like the original securities laws, Dodd-Frank was enacted in
response to public sentiment about inappropriate behavior on the part of
the financial community—this time, the events leading up the financial

243.
244.

Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 118 (“Brown has put forth no persuasive reason why this passage from
Janus, specifically limiting the scope of private rights of action under Rule 10b-5,
should be read to reach enforcement actions brought by the SEC pursuant to Rule 13a14”).
245. Id.
246. No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012).
247. Id. at *15.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Compare SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), with SEC
v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
251. SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2012).
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crisis of 2008.252 The legislative history indicates that Congress actually
considered extending civil liability not only in SEC actions, but as a
private cause of action as well. 253 While the drafters of Dodd-Frank
ultimately declined to go that far, the statutory language does clarify
those remedies available to the SEC.254 This Part will discuss how the
statutory language clarifies the remedies available to those seeking
liability for violators of the Securities Acts. It will then discuss how
these new remedies have affected the SEC’s enforcement strategy
giving the treatment of Janus by federal courts.
A. IMPACT ON AIDERS AND ABETTORS
Dodd-Frank greatly expanded the SEC’s ability to pursue aiding
and abetting violations. 255 The statutory language explicitly gave the
SEC authority to pursue violations under section 15(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933, as well as the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.256 It also
clarifies the ambiguity left by the PSLRA by explicitly stating that the
SEC may prosecute anyone who “knowingly or recklessly” provides
substantial assistance to another person who violates any provision of
the 1934 Act.257 This is, of course, a substantially lower bar for bringing
claims than actual knowledge. While it remains to be seen the impact
that Dodd-Frank will have on aiding and abetting actions, because they
cannot be applied retroactively, it is clear that they will greatly increase
the SEC’s chances of success in those cases.258

252. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 2010, at B3.
253. While it ultimately did not decide to extend a private right of action, Congress
did commission a study by the Government Accountability Office to study whether or
not one would be appropriate.
254. See infra Part III.A–B.
255. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS (2010).
256. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No 11-203 §929O, 123 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010)
(amending Exchange Act § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)).
257. Id.
258. See discussion infra Part IV.
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B. IMPACT ON CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY
Dodd-Frank clarifies the SEC’s ability to prosecute for control
person liability under the Exchange Act.259 The Act makes clear that the
SEC may bring actions under control person liability in federal court by
inserting language explicitly referencing SEC enforcement actions. 260
The control persons bear the burden of showing that they acted in good
faith, and that “they did not directly or indirectly induce” the primary
violation.261 Thus, while a seemingly minor change, the SEC now has
no doubt about its ability to bring control person actions.262 The impact
this could have on its enforcement strategy will be discussed in Section
F.
C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN SECONDARY LIABILITY POST DODD-FRANK
AND JANUS
A recent decision in the Second Circuit clarifying the substantial
assistance prong of aiding and abetting could affect the SEC’s strategy
post-Janus and Dodd-Frank. SEC v. Apuzzo concerned an action against
Joseph Apuzzo, the Chief Financial Officer of a construction and mining
equipment manufacturer, Terex.263 In accordance with an arrangement
with a second company, General Electric Credit Corporation, Apuzzo
helped disguise a third company, United Rental Inc.’s (“URI”) risks and
financial obligations, and approved invoices he knew to be inflated.264

259. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No 11-203 §929P, 123 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010)
(amending Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)).
260. The new language states:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision
of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and
severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable (including to the Commission in any action brought
under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this title), unless the controlling person
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting
the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
261. Bruce Hiler & Sharon Rose, Analysis of Changes to the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Powers in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 42 BNA INSIGHTS 48 (2010).
262. See generally CCH, supra note 253.
263. SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
264. Id. at 207–08.
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In addition, despite his knowledge that some of URI’s equipment was
overvalued, Apuzzo offered auditors a note indicating that “nothing
ha[d] come to his attention” to make him question the valuation of
URI’s equipment. 265 In exchange, URI agreed to make substantial
purchases of equipment from Terex.266 The district court agreed with
Apuzzo’s argument that there was nothing to show that his conduct
caused the primary violation.267
The Second Circuit reversed, however, using a classic definition of
aiding and abetting drawn from criminal law to find that the “test for
substantial assistance is that the aider and abettor “in some sort
associated himself with the venture, that he participated in it as in
something that he wished to bring about, and that he sought by his
action to make succeed.”268 The court emphasized that due to Central
Bank and the PSLRA, enforcement actions differed from private
litigation, and clarified that the SEC did not have to show that an aider
or abettor was the proximate cause of a primary securities law
violation.269
In Apuzzo, Judge Rakoff also acknowledged the consequences of a
standard for substantial assistance that was too high for the SEC to
prove, arguing that given the lack of a private of a right of action for
aiding and abetting violations,270 imposing too high of a proximate cause
requirement would essentially allow all aiders and abettors to avoid

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 213.
Id. (“We now clarify that . . . the SEC is not required to plead or prove that an
aider an abettor proximately caused the primary securities law violation. . . 15 U.S.C. §
78t(e), was passed in the wake of Central Bank precisely to allow the SEC to pursue
aiders and abettors . . . . This statutory mandate would be undercut if proximate
causation were required for aider and abettor liability in SEC enforcement actions.”).
270. Due to the decision in Central Bank and Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta,
private parties cannot bring actions for aiding and abetting. The Court in Stonebridge
rejected the idea that secondary actors would escape liability if the private right of
action was further diminished: “Since September 30, 2002, SEC enforcement actions
have collected over 10 billion in disgorgement and penalties, much of it for distribution
to injured investors. The inability to bring aiding and abetting actions and reduced
ability to bring primary actions under 10(b) means investors may have to rely even
more on SEC enforcement actions.” Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008).
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liability. 271 In doing so, Judge Rakoff was likely acknowledging the
lack of remedies for pursuing aiders and abettors. With the SEC being
the sole entity that could bring action against them, a burden that was
too high would let those who aided and abetted escape without
consequences far too often.272
D. SEC ENFORCEMENT IN AIDING AND ABETTING ACTIONS AFTER JANUS
AND DODD-FRANK
While even the SEC seems to have conceded the point that the
narrow take on the definition of “make” has removed its ability to bring
enforcement actions under Rule 10b-5(b), its series of victories after
Kelly indicates that Janus’s effect on its ability to pursue securities law
violators under primary liability may be quite narrow. The post-Janus
case law indicates that courts are somewhat reluctant to extend the
definition of “make” beyond Rule 10b-5(b) actions. Rather than
asserting liability under Rule 10b-5, the SEC will attempt to use other
provisions in the federal securities laws, such as section 17(a) or
“scheme liability” under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c).
However, given the changes to Dodd-Frank, it behooves the SEC to
add section 20(e) aiding and abetting charges in addition to charges of
primary liability, particularly if other circuits follow the standard set by
Apuzzo. 273 With the lowered standard of knowledge written into section
20(e) under Dodd-Frank, as well as the decision in Apuzzo, the SEC has
a much clearer path to victory to aiding and abetting violations than they
did prior to the Act. A recent case, SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA,
could signal the trend the SEC will take given the implications of the
Janus ruling.274
In that case, the SEC sought an enforcement action against Big
Apple, its wholly owned subsidiary, MJMM, and three executives for
their connection to Cyberkey, a party who was not involved in the
litigation, but who had had fraudulently reported a contract with the
Department of Homeland Security.275 The SEC initially alleged, among
other violations, section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a)
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Apuzzo, 689 F.3d at 213.
See id. at 213.
SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 6:09-CV-1963-ORL-28, 2012 WL
3264512 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012)
275. Id. at *2.

676

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XIX

violations. 276 However, after Janus was decided, the SEC withdrew
their section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 charges, and added section 20(e)
charges for aiding and abetting. 277 The court allowed the SEC to
proceed on the section 17(a) claims, as well as the aiding and abetting
claim.278 This case is indicative of what the SEC’s strategy maybe with
its ability to use Rule 10b-5 diminished but new powers gained under
Dodd-Frank.279 With the Commission’s ability to find primary liability
diminished, it likely will assert secondary liability as an alternative
option.280
The provisions relating to aiding and abetting cannot be applied
retroactively.281 The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Graham v. SEC,282 while
pre-Dodd Frank, could offer a perspective as to how courts could treat
aiding and abetting defendants under the recklessness standard. In that
case, the court found a broker liable for failing to notice that a customer
was fraudulently trading in stocks.283 The court noted, however, that it
was not holding Graham liable for executing the fraudulent trades, but
for failure to notice “numerous suspicious circumstances.” 284 These
trades included “economically irrational trading,” the fact that she knew
her client was experiencing financial difficulties, and the client’s
insistence on specifying the contra-broker with whom he wanted
Graham to execute the trade.285
More recent cases demonstrate that a recklessness standard will
make aiding and abetting violations a great deal easier than before. The
Southern District of New York has found allegations of recklessness are
met where the SEC showed that the defendant didn’t fulfill its duty to
monitor, or did not notice obvious signs of fraud.286 In another case, the
court found the defendant liable where the SEC was able to show that
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
See SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc. Litig., Release No. 22219, 102 SEC
2798 (Jan. 4, 2012), available at 2012 WL 8703670.
280. Maria Lokshin, SEC Sees Spike in Aiding/Abetting, Control-Person Claims
After Janus, BLOOMBERG BNA, 45 SRLR ISSUE NO. 9.
281. SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA 2011 WL 3295139, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 1, 2011).
282. Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1005–06 (D.C Cir 1999).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1004.
285. Id. at 1004–06.
286. SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
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the defendant had access to information that demonstrated she knew or
should have known that fraud was taking place.287
With regards to substantial assistance, the Southern District of New
York has already used the Apuzzo standard successfully to find
executive officers of the Federal National Mortgage Association liable
under section 20(e) for aiding and abetting misrepresentations of their
company’s subprime mortgage exposure. 288 The court found that the
officers fit the new standard because they reviewed periodic filings,
commented on, discussed, and signed SEC filings in which fraudulent
misrepresentations were made.289
Thus, not only does the SEC have a significantly lower burden for
bringing aiding and abetting actions, but it also potentially has a wider
net from which to seek liability for improper corporate activity. 290 The
SEC should continue to use section 20(e) against both primary violators
for whom it thinks the Janus standard might make it too difficult to
succeed on a primary violation claim, and secondary violators such as
accountants, lawyers, investment banks, and other entities who clearly
could have put a stop to fraudulent activity.
E. LIMITATIONS
Of course, the increased ability to pursue aiders and abettors is not
a cure-all for issues the SEC may have with enforcement after Janus.
Although Daifotis was a victory for the SEC in its refusal to apply Janus
beyond Rule 10b-5, the court also indicated that Justice Breyer’s dissent
might have been prophetic in its warning about the ability of the SEC to
pursue secondary actors. 291 In charging Daifotis with aiding and
abetting, the Commission alleged that the primary violator was Charles
Schwab. 292 The court granted summary judgment as to aiding and
287.
288.
289.
290.

SEC v. Mudd, 885 F. Supp 2d 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
Id. at 670–71.
Id. at 671.
See, e.g. SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 6:09-CV-1963-ORL-28,
2012 WL 3264512 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012); SEC v. Mudd, 885 F. Supp 2d 654
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc. Litig., Release No. 2221922219,
102 SEC 2798 (Jan. 4, 2012), available at 2012 WL 8703670.
291.
292.

SEC v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp 2d 870, 876 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
Id. at 874 (stating that the SEC had not proved scienter on the part of anyone
except the defendant).
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abetting under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 pointing out that in order to
show that Daifotis aided and abetted a primary violation, the SEC had to
show scienter on the part of Charles Schwab, which it had not yet
done.293 The court also granted summary judgment as to violations of
the Investment Advisers Act.294
Furthermore, as Judge Rakoff acknowledged in lowering the
standard for substantial assistance in Apuzzo,295 the SEC is the only one
who can pursue aiding and abetting liability. It would be logistically
impossible to pursue every person or company who can be found to
have aided and abetted a securities law violation.296 While the DoddFrank Act also demanded a study about the merit of a private right of
action against aiders and abettors,297 it is unlikely that any action will be
taken on that soon. 298 Therefore, the SEC must carefully pick and
choose who asserts aiding and abetting liability against.
F. CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY AFTER DODD-FRANK
It is difficult to assess the impact of control person liability after
Dodd-Frank given the paucity of cases. However, despite the circuit
split, shortly before Dodd-Frank was enacted, the SEC had brought
control person liability suits in two high-profile cases.299 Roughly a year
before Dodd-Frank was enacted, the SEC brought charges against
former AIG CEO Hank Greenberg for securities fraud violations made
by the insurance company. 300 The case was eventually settled by a
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 886–87.
Id. at 887.
SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Section 20(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act allows the SEC, but not private litigants, to bring civil actions
against aiders and abettors of securities fraud.”).
296. For a discussion on the limitation on the SEC’s to bring enforcement actions,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Enforcement: Talking the Talk, But Walking the Walk?,
CLS
BLUE
SKY
BLOG
(Nov.
25,
2013),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/11/25/sec-enforcement-talking-the-talk-butwalking-the-walk/.
297. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Pub. L.No.
111-203, § 929Z(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
298. See generally Ho, supra note 5, at 184.
299. See generally, SEC v. Greenberg, Release No. AE-3032, 96 SEC 1702 (Aug.
6, 2009), available at 2009 WL 2413951;
300. SEC v. Greenberg, Release No. AE-3032, 96 SEC 1702 (Aug. 6, 2009),
available at 2009 WL 2413951
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consent agreement, in which Greenberg agreed to pay $15 million
dollars.301 The same month, the SEC brought control person charges
against Nature’s Sunshine Products, its CEO, Douglas Faggioli, and its
former CFO, Craig D. Huff.302 The defendants also all agreed to consent
agreements, which enjoined them from future violations, and paid civil
penalties as well.303
These cases demonstrate that the SEC was not afraid to use control
person liability where it saw fit, even with its ability to bring actions
ambiguous. With its ability to pursue control person actions clarified,
the SEC is likely to assert control liability as an enforcement mechanism
more often.304 As one commentator has pointed out, given the typical
enforcement action brought by the SEC, it is not difficult for the
Commission to find one or more executives who should have been on
notice for fraudulent activity going on. 305 However, because DoddFrank did not resolve the circuit split about the degree that a control
person needed to be involved in order to be liable, it is still unclear how
successful a control person action will be.
It is worth noting that since the settlement agreements reached in
Greenberg and National Securities Products, there has been intense
judicial scrutiny over SEC use of consent agreements whereby the
Commission secures a fine from the defendant without demanding the
defendant admits wrongdoing.306 Judge Rakoff of the Southern District
of New York, the most high-profile of these critics, set a new precedent
by refusing to enforce a settlement agreement between the SEC and
Citigroup over Citigroup’s fraudulent activities in the period leading up
to the final crisis.307 The SEC, Judge Rakoff explained, was not acting
in the public interest by simply allowing Citigroup to settle the action
without demanding serious consequences or an admission of guilt. 308
301.
302.

Id.
SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc., Release No. LR-21162 (July 31, 2009),
available at 2009 WL 5734301; SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc., Release No.
LR-21162 (July 31, 2009), available at 2009 WL 5734301.
303. Id. at 2.
304. See supra note 294.
305. Bruce Hiler and Sharon Rose, Expansion of the U.S.’s SEC Enforcement
Powers Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 17
WORLD SEC. LAW REP. 1, 3–4 (2011).
306. SEC. v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc, 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 331 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
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This decision is currently pending before the Second Circuit 309 and
could have a significant impact on the way in which control person
liability is pursued. If the Second Circuit finds that the no-admit
settlements were against the public interest, as Judge Rakoff indicated,
then the SEC may be less willing to bring actions. The cost of litigation
for each and every control person enforcement action to its finality
could prove prohibitive. However, these scenarios could also mean the
SEC will seek severe consequences in the cases where they do assert
control person liability.
CONCLUSION
The trend in courts indicates that courts are reluctant to extend
Janus beyond Rule 10b-5 actions. However, with the new weapons to
assert aiding and abetting liability against secondary actors, the SEC
should nonetheless continue to add section 20(e) and section 20(a)
violations to primary ones. While the diminished ability to bring section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions will hurt chances of establishing a primary
violation, the lower burdens of proof for secondary liability will give the
Commission a greater chance of success in pursing secondary actors.
Furthermore, given that private parties have even less recourse to assert
any kind of liability against secondary actors, it is necessary for the SEC
to fill in the gap.
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